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Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Ethics 
 
Part II: Problems and Limitations 
 
Finn Arler 
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis includes a large number of choices and considerations, 
many of which are controversial or includes a high degree of uncertainty. In 
complex cases there is room enough for a whole army of devils to move into 
the details. One of the key principles, which ought to be observed by all 
analysts, is therefore full disclosure and transparency in order for the conclu-
sions to be tested and assessed by independent observers. Any analyst striv-
ing to live up to the previously cited U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
demand for “honesty and integrity” should highlight all potentially contro-
versial or uncertain assumptions. This is particularly important in cases 
where assumptions are hidden in a specific methodology. Similarly, it is 
extremely important to present sensitivity tests based on alternative assump-
tions in relation to all controversial issues that have vital impact on the out-
come of the analysis in order to separate robust conclusions from shaky 
ones.  
 
These principles should be observed even more carefully when analysts ad-
dress a general public not familiar with cost-benefit analysis. It is quite simp-
ly bad practice to present conclusions to the public as if they were the result 
of pure and unbiased science without mentioning any of the potentially con-
troversial assumptions, which almost always have significant impact on the 
conclusions. 
 
In this chapter, I will focus on some of the issues which are most likely to 
cause controversy, and which should therefore be treated with utmost care 
by analysts as well as by readers and users of cost-benefit analysis. All prob-
lems are somehow related to the basic idea of using the (ideal) market as the 
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basic model and seeing economics as a value-free science apart from one 
single goal: improving the efficiency of satisfying private preferences by 
chasing Pareto optimums. I shall exemplify some of the problems related to 
the extension of market logic and economic calculation beyond the custom-
ary limits of the market: putting a price on human lives, on critical and 
unique resources, and on future costs and benefits. In the concluding part of 
the chapter, I will discuss the use of cost-benefit analysis more generally. 
 
 
Monetising non-market goods  
 
 
Monetising losses of human lives 
 
It is a basic assumption in cost-benefit analysis that all cost and benefits need 
to be monetised in order to identify the most efficient solution. It is neces-
sary, therefore, to attach economic values even to objects, which are not 
normally traded on the market. One of most controversial elements is the 
monetisation of human lives (or of potential losses of human lives).  
 
Basically, there are two ways to approach this issue. On one hand, we have 
an approach in line with Thomas Hobbes’ classical statement that a human 
being is just one more thing, the utility of which can be valuated on the mar-
ket: “The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that 
is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore 
is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of others” 
(Hobbes 1651/1968, 152). A person’s value is relative to the needs and 
judgment of others, and these are expressed as willingness to pay in acts of 
exchange. The market can accordingly provide an objective measure for the 
valuation of human lives. Hobbes did not distinguish between the value (or 
worth) of a human being in him- or herself and the value of the use of his or 
her labour power, and he could therefore quite easily put a price on human 
beings. The price of a lost human life equals the loss of its labour power in 
the expected remaining working period (assuming that nobody else is unem-
ployed, capable, and ready to take over).  
 
Obviously, it will have quite significant consequences, if it is generally ac-
cepted that the value of human lives depends on the market value of their 
labour power. For instance, the loss of an African man with a low salary will 
be much cheaper than the loss of a New York stock exchange gambler with a 
large income. The loss of an African woman, whose work is not registered 
on the market, would have no influence at all on the account, because she 
has an opportunity cost of zero on the labour market. The loss of sick or 
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elderly people, who live off their pension and maybe are given extensive 
medical treatment, would even be counted as an economic benefit. However, 
even though attempts to get rid of these people would be recommendable 
from a narrowly economic point of view – and worth considering from that 
of a utilitarian satisfied with counting pain and pleasure – this would be con-
sidered a repugnant conclusion from any other ethical point of view. 
 
Opposed to the Hobbesian approach we find the kind of argument, which has 
been put forward most forcefully by the German philosopher Immanuel 
Kant: “Whatever has a price can be treated as an equivalent to other things; 
that, however, which is raised beyond every price, and therefore cannot be 
treated as an equivalent, has a worth [Würde]” (Kant 1785/1965). Every-
thing, which can be treated simply as a means to satisfy human needs or 
wants, has a price or exchange value and can be traded on the market. This 
includes human labour power, which is traded on the labour market. On the 
other hand, we cannot ascribe an exchange value to that which has intrinsic 
value or worth, and according to Kant this is the privilege of rational (hu-
man) beings. Rational beings should never be treated simply as means to 
satisfy external ends, but always also as ends in themselves. 
 
Slavery, the buying and selling of human beings, was abolished long time 
ago, and no one would accept that people were allowed to kill each other, if 
only they paid the market value of the lost labour power. Nor do we, in ordi-
nary situations, see the death of one particular, identifiable (and innocent) 
person as an acceptable price to pay in order to obtain a certain benefit. This 
would be the case, for instance, if a medical company or a public hospital 
picked out somebody with the right genes and inflicting him or her involun-
tarily with a deadly decease in order to test a new drug, which is expected to 
help many others. In general, we accept the Kantian argument that human 
beings (or their flourishing) should never be treated as means only, but al-
ways also as ends in themselves. In this sense they are priceless (and not, as 
some economists, who miss the whole point, try to put it in order to defeat it: 
of infinite value).  
 
At the same time, however, we cannot avoid making decisions, which short-
en some people’s lives. For instance, we do not spend the major part of our 
resources in hospitals trying to lengthen the lives of dying people, and even 
if we did, this would eventually cause deaths somewhere else like, say, on 
disrepaired roads. Many economists argue that potential losses of human 
lives are likely to be forgotten in the process of decision making, if we refuse 
to put a price on them considered of as statistical lives. Let us assume for a 
moment, then, that it does make sense to put a price on (losses of) human 
lives. What exactly are we putting a price on in this case? Several sugges-
tions have been put forward. Let me concentrate on three main candidates. 
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The first candidate is the loss of potential labour power. This is estimated in 
the so-called human capital approach. In this case, we are faced with the 
problem of elderly people with a negative price, people who are not related 
to the labour market, etc. Getting rid of these people would improve net ben-
efit. A hideous conclusion that is, indeed. One way to solve this problem 
could be to use the average income of an individual midway in a life of aver-
age length. This would raise the problem immediately whether we are talk-
ing about the average national or global income and life length. In the first 
case the loss of human lives in poor countries would be far cheaper than in 
rich countries, wherefore the riskiest projects would be placed in the lands of 
the poorest without their previously stated consent. In the second case, the 
price would be so low that, particularly in rich countries, it would pay very 
well not to care about the loss of human lives.  
 
Another way of estimating the potential loss of a human life is to estimate 
the total value of production losses due to mortal accidents and then divide 
this total value by the number of lost human lives. This method is used, for 
instance, by the Danish Road Directorate, and recommended by the Danish 
Ministry of Finance. It leads to a value around €300,000 per “statistical life” 
(1999-prices) (Vejdirektoratet 2001; Finansministeriet 1999). 
 
However, an account of the loss of potential labour power does not include 
the losses inflicted on the relatives of a dead person. A second candidate is 
therefore the loss of potential labour power plus the pain and sorrow inflict-
ed on relatives. In this case, however, there are no reliable market based 
values or prices to refer to. The loss of a spouse, a mother, a son, or a close 
friend has no true market value. In fact, if somebody asked you what you 
would consider a fair price for the realisation of a project, which he is about 
to put to work, and which can be expected to cause the death of your child, 
you would immediately denounce him to the police.  
 
We could try to move a step away from the specific cases, though, and ask, 
for instance, how much potential victims and potential relatives of victims 
would find it equitable to pay to an insurance fund compensating the rela-
tives of possible future (by now unknown) victims of a project, which would 
be profitable to themselves. A project would be acceptable only if it could 
actually sponsor a fund of a size, which could compensate relatives to future 
victims, and still be profitable. This way, it seems, we can calculate an indi-
rect measure of the value of a lost life. In relation to public projects like 
roads or bridges the compensation of relatives could simply be estimated as 
that which the political authorities would be willing to pay as compensation, 
if they had to. This is how the Danish Road Directorate justifies the use in 
cost-benefit analysis of virtual compensations to relatives around €600,000 
per lost life (Vejdirektoratet 2001; Finansministeriet 1999). 
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However, the payments from the fund would not truly be compensating 
those who actually loose the relatives, nor the victims themselves, of course. 
Instead, one might set up a kind of gambling situation with losers and win-
ners. In this case the price or value is not actually put on the loss of human 
lives, nor on the pain and sorrow of loosing a relative, but instead on the 
additional (or reduced) risk of loosing one’s own or a relative’s life that one 
is (voluntarily) ready to accept in order to obtain a certain extra bonus, or 
“the value of the reduced probability of death that is experienced by the af-
fected population” (Viscusi & Aldy 2003, 6). This is our third candidate, 
then. This candidate is coherent with the Kantian line of argument, because 
it does not involve inappropriate pricing of priceless entities.  
 
The exact compensation for a loss of a human life would in this case be de-
pending on the likelihood of loosing as well as on the extra benefit one ex-
pects to obtain. Consequently, it cannot be the same in all kinds of situations. 
As the risk gets higher and the expected benefit gets lower, the price goes up 
and vice versa. Not linearly, but exponentially. The first percent of extra risk 
will be less expensive than the next percent, and the last 5 percent between 
95 and 100 will be impossible to pay. It is therefore important to notice in 
which part of the spectrum the incremental risk is placed. 
 
Moreover, because the willingness to pay for risk reductions (or to accept 
risk increases) is fairly differentiated, not only across individuals (of differ-
ent age, gender, health status, life quality, risk aversion, etc.) but also across 
income groups and cultures, it is quite problematic to use just one average 
measure of risk acceptance covering all risks in all situations at all places. 
The various surveys that have been made only tell about the indirectly re-
vealed preferences in a given sample of people living under a specific set of 
circumstances accepting a specified kind of risk. These results cannot be 
generalized to a universal measure of a “statistical life” (Viscusi & Aldy 
2003, 18), but are often used as such through so-called value transfers due to 
lack of time and money for differentiated studies (U.S. EPA 2000, 88).  
 
If risks are imposed involuntarily, i.e., without a stated consent, the price 
ought to be significantly higher, of course (and the project should often be 
reconsidered). Other factors which affect risk perception are whether the 
risks are ordinary or catastrophic; occasional or continuous; immediate, de-
layed or latent; man-made or not; well-known or not; controllable or not; 
possible to avoid through averting behaviour or not; necessary or not (U.S. 
EPA 2000, 91; Pearce 2000, 12 & 18f). These dissimilarities make it even 
more problematic to make value transfers from one case to another, and even 
more so because the studies made so far are not very helpful in identifying 
the relevant factors that could explain significant variations between cases 
(Pearce 2000). If these factors were all well known, adequate adjustments 
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could, if only in principle, be made in cases of value transfer by the use of 
so-called meta-analysis (or other more informal methods). 
 
The primary approach to estimating the value of an additional (or reduced) 
risk is hedonic pricing, first of all inferred from statistics on wages in jobs 
with higher than average mortality risks, but price-risk trade-offs for seatbelt 
use, cigarette smoking, automobile safety, bicycle helmets, etc. have also 
been studied (in so-called “averting behaviour” or “consumer market” stud-
ies). Contingent valuation methods have also been used. These studies can 
be designed in many different ways, some of which are not particularly reli-
able (for a comprehensive account of methods and accomplished studies, see 
Viscusi & Aldy 2003). The basic idea is to multiply the additional (or re-
duced) risk by the extra (or reduced) income. For example, if 1000 workers 
accept an extra wage of $5000 due to an additional risk of 0.001 percent, i.e., 
one of then can be expected to die during work, the value of a “statistical 
life” is $5 million (assuming, contrafactually, sufficient labour mobility and 
full information about actual risks).  
 
Half of the U.S. hedonic labour market studies surveyed by Viscusi & Aldy 
found the cost of a “statistical life” to fall within a range of $5-12 million 
with a median of $7 million, but the studies vary significantly (Viscusi & 
Aldy 2003, 18ff). This is not far from the value recommended in the U.S. 
EPA Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analysis: $6.1 million (U.S. EPA 
2000, 90). In the EU-sponsored ExternE-project the recommended value for 
“statistical lives” lost or gained within the EU is somewhat lower: €3.1 mil-
lion, which is estimated on the basis of a survey of European studies (Euro-
pean Commission 1999, 232ff).  
 
It is worth noticing that by far the highest risk in any of the surveyed studies 
were 0.2 percent; in most studies the risks were significantly lower. If the 
price on risks grows exponentially as the risks increase, the stated costs are 
only reasonable in low risk cases. At the same time the low risks makes peo-
ple’s behaviour quite unpredictable due to the difficulty of dealing consist-
ently when confronted with such small numbers. Moreover, the studies only 
include the potential victims’ own willingness to pay or accept, not those of 
their relatives, the inclusion of which may increase the value significantly 
(Pearce 2000, 26f). 
 
It is also worth noticing that the willingness to accept risks is highly income-
elastic; in countries with a lower average income than in the U.S. the costs of 
additional risks are lower. Several cost-benefit analyses of global issues, 
amongst which can be mentioned the ExternE-project, therefore adjust for 
this by multiplying the value of a “statistical life” by the ratio of the real 
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GNP (GNP adjusted for purchasing power parity) in each country to the real 
GNP in the EU (European Commission 1999, 236ff).  
 
An important consequence of this highly controversial adjustment is that 
damages causing losses of human lives will be much cheaper in poor coun-
tries. In Rwanda, for instance, the value of a “statistical life” is estimated to 
€58.000, whereas a “statistical life” in Norway is worth €3.5 million or some 
60 times as much. This is quite obviously a problematic conclusion, particu-
larly because the inhabitants of Rwanda will not gain anything from having 
the negative impacts of climate change fall in their country (thus making 
costs cheaper), unlike richer countries with significant emissions of green-
house gasses. It is worth noticing, too, that the value of a “statistical life” 
would increase with economic growth, wherefore losses or gains of lives 
cannot be discounted for the same reason as other costs and benefits.  
 
The values from the described procedure could also be used in a calculation 
of an average global value of a “statistical life.” This is the kind of calcula-
tion lying behind the EU Commission’s DG Environment’s recommendation 
to use a value around €1.0 million (2000 prices) with an upper estimate of 
€2.5 million and a lower estimate of €0.65 million (European Commission 
1999 and 2001). This obviously reduces the costs of human lives in industri-
alized countries significantly without the consent of the people affected. 
 
A fourth and a fifth candidate should be mentioned, if only in passing, name-
ly life-years lost and life-years remaining. In both cases it is not life as such 
that is valued, nor the incremental risk of loosing it, but the expected number 
of life-years lost or gained. Although many of the issues already mentioned 
are relevant in these cases as well, there are a couple of important differ-
ences, too. First of all, age is more important in these cases. In the first case 
(life years lost) children’s deaths are much more costly than the death of 
older people, because more life years are lost. In the second case (life years 
remaining) one can expect dissimilar reactions from people at different ages, 
particularly in cases of delayed and latent risks.  
 
Generally speaking, there is no single value to attach to the loss (or saving) 
of a human life. There are various ways to estimate losses based on different 
sets of assumptions. Some of these differentiate considerably between dif-
ferent groups of people, due to differences in income, age, etc., whereas 
others seek averages. There is not one approach which is recommendable in 
all respects. This is not a result one should be sad about, however. It only 
makes it more obvious that it is a political task to make decisions – including 
the selection of which methodology (if any) to rely on. 
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Moreover, to talk about “the value of a life” or “the value of a statistical life” 
is bewildering at best (cf. also OMB 1996, 25f). The fact is that I have not 
come across any convincing arguments on how to monetise the loss of hu-
man lives. After all, it is only circumstantial matters that are monetised: the 
value of lost labour, incremental costs of medical treatment, the value of risk 
avoidance, the compensation of relatives, etc., not the loss of a human life 
itself. Nobody can be compensated properly for their own death. Conse-
quently, when constructing a cost-benefit analysis one should always make a 
separate account of expected losses or gains of human lives.  
 
The choice of exposing factions of citizens to increased risks due to the pro-
vision of a certain good is basically a social task, based on weightings of 
monetised as well as non-monetised costs and benefits, not simply an aggre-
gation of individual accounts. Individual valuations can only give decision 
makers some hints about their willingness to back up decisions.  
 
 
Monetising critical and unique resources 
 
It is generally assumed in cost-benefit analysis that goods and resources can 
be substituted without limitation. “If you don’t eat one species of fish, you 
can eat another species of fish,” as the American economist Robert Solow 
has put it, and if there are no fish left at all, you can eat something else. All 
resources are considered “fungible” (Solow 1993, 181); they can be re-
placed, and will be replaced without loss by others, whenever the price is 
right. In cost-benefit accounts it is therefore crucial to put the correct eco-
nomic value on all kinds of resources in order to find the most economically 
sound solutions in cases of market failure. 
 
There is one problem, though, which most economists recognize: the prob-
lem of critical resources, i.e., basic life-support resources like clean water or 
ecosystem stability (or resilience) which cannot be substituted for by any-
thing else, and the loss of which may be irreversible or at least damaging for 
a significant period of time. This is a problem, which has turned up particu-
larly in relation to the question of sustainability. Some hard core economists, 
supporting the weakest possible concept of sustainability, have argued that 
this is not a real problem, because the price of these resources will rise as 
soon as they become sparse. This is not altogether convincing, however. 
Partly because many decisions are made on the basis of a very short time 
horizon, from which future damages are not visible. Partly because some 
non-substitutable resources just do not come out in large numbers. Still, it is 
not an easy task to identify the critical resources, which are not likely to be 
preserved in an appropriate way by the market mechanisms (Turner & 
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Pearce 1993, Holland 1997, Holland 1999, Ekins et.al. 2003, Ekins 2003, De 
Groot et.al. 2003, Chiesura & De Groot 2003). 
 
I have suggested that we distinguish between three kinds of resources as 
presented in Figure 2 (Arler 2001 and 2003) Firstly, there are exchangeable 
resources, which can be substituted for by other resources, as long as there 
are enough of these with sufficiently similar qualities, without any further 
problems. The standard example is fossil fuels, which can, in principle, be 
substituted for by other energy sources. Nobody will miss coal, if there is 
energy enough to collect from other sources. Similarly, ordinary consumer 
goods are regularly exchanged and substituted for, and their value mainly 
depends on transitory needs and preferences. These are the kinds of re-
sources whose destiny can be safely left to market mechanisms (or similar 
social devices) to determine. 
 
 
Figure 2:  The three kinds of resources: exchangeable, critical, and unique. 
 
Critical resources, on the other hand, are not so easy to do without, no matter 
which kinds of life style future generations are going to choose. Just like us, 
they will need sufficiently clean air and water as well as other basic re-
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sources, which are fundamental to human beings as biological creatures. The 
line between exchangeable and critical resources is a fuzzy one, however, 
because it remains an open question to what extent precaution needs to be 
taken. How clean is sufficiently clean, for instance? How many risks are we 
willing to take – or rather: let future generations suffer from? These are to 
large extent cultural questions, and the answers very much depend on a spe-
cific culture’s attitude towards risks and environmental quality. Similarly, 
although it is possible to survive as biological creatures with a fairly limited 
amount of resources, it may not be possible to keep up the living standards 
of today. In this sense the identification of critical resources depends on 
which baseline living standard is chosen. It also very much depends on local 
circumstances, unless it is assumed that people should simply move away 
from a locality, when resources, which are critical for human life in this area, 
are consumed or otherwise damaged. Finally, if the well-being of (some) 
others species are included in the concept of sustainability (Dobson 1998), 
this would expand the number of critical resources significantly. 
 
The third category of resources is unique resources. These are resources, 
which are not indispensable for our survival as biological creatures, not even 
for a continuation of high living standards, but only for particular cultures’ 
identity. They cannot be exchanged or substituted as simply as more ordi-
nary things. Obvious examples are spectacular biological species or biodi-
versity in general, rare ecosystem-types, old and significant cultural crea-
tions, historically important sites, etc. Several of these are listed as heritage 
values on a local, national, or global level. Locally or nationally, there may 
also be a number of values, the fate of which is not left to be determined by 
private preferences. It may be decided, for instance, that preservation of 
clean ground water is considered to be so important for a specific communi-
ty that it should not be submitted to pressure from market forces. This is the 
reason why it was decided in the U.S. of the early 70’s not to use cost-
benefit analysis before making policies related to the Clean Air Act, the 
Clean Water Act (Cropper and Oakes 1992, 675; Arrow et.al. 1996, 4) as 
well as the Endangered Species Act (Nash 1989).  
 
Again, there is no clear-cut line between the unique resources and two other 
kinds. Some resources are certainly more unique than others, and the precise 
list is inevitably going to change along with the cultural changes in general. 
However, the basic point is that the identification of unique resources is a 
common – cultural and political – task, where due respect ought to be given 
to inputs from experts and connoisseurs, not a consumer issue. It is more 
related to the question of who we are rather than to what we prefer to have 
(Sandel 1982, 180). This is exactly the reason why unique resources are so 
difficult to deal with in cost-benefit analyses. 
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Monetization may not be totally out of the question, though. If an attachment 
of economic value appears to be appropriate for some good reason, it should 
not be based simply on the individual’s private preferences, however. In-
stead, it should be the result of a common deliberation about a particular 
community’s priorities, where everybody behaves as a citizen, and not simp-
ly as a self-interested consumer (Sagoff 1998). It should reflect what the 
citizens or their (ideally: well-informed and virtuous) representatives have 
agreed to consider important – or made compromises about – after an open 
process of deliberation in a Habermasian spirit, not an aggregation of what 
isolated individuals may happen to wish for themselves. Even though it is 
likely that there will be a certain amount of disagreement, and procedural 
justice therefore becomes a separate issue (Miller 1999), it is basically not a 
question about the quantity of supporting persons or feelings, but about the 
quality of supporting arguments. What is important, too, is to realize that this 
kind of valuation cannot be made once and for all; inevitably, it will change 
with the circumstances.  
 
 
The distributive problem 
 
 
Distribution within generations 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, cost-benefit analysis relies on the poten-
tial Pareto-improvement rule stating that policies and projects should be 
adopted if and only if the net benefits are positive, or, in accordance with the 
Kaldor/Hicks criterion, if and only if those who are likely to gain from it can 
be expected, in principle, to be able to compensate those who are likely to 
lose, and still be better off than before.  
 
The potential Pareto-improvement rule or Kaldor/Hicks criterion both appear 
quite appalling. How can the potential compensation of victims be used as a 
justification, if the victims are not actually compensated? There is also a 
great amount of build-in conservatism in cost-benefit analysis. Due to the 
fundamental and sovereign criterion of potential Pareto-improvement, status 
quo, the existing equilibrium is used as baseline, no matter how inequitable 
this may seem. If, to use an extreme example, a society is dominated by a 
few very rich companies or individuals, due to some dim occurrences in the 
past, whereas the rest of the population live in extreme poverty, a cost-
benefit analysis would recommend a project which made the oligarchs so 
much richer that they could, in principle, compensate the losers among the 
poor people. Whatever happened before the present situation is considered as 
“sunken” costs and benefits and not included in the calculation. 
632  ·  Cost-Benefit Analysis and Ethics - Part II: Problems and Limitations 
 
The potential Pareto-improvement rule or Kaldor/Hicks criterion are usually 
defended by the following arguments (cf. Boardman et al. 1996, 32f). First-
ly, when society as a whole becomes richer the worst off members of society 
are likely to benefit. Even if a more unequal distribution results from using 
the rule in a certain case, the poorest members of society will still be better 
off than they would have been without this application. If a more equal re-
distribution is wished for, this will be easier to accomplish separately when 
society becomes richer.  
 
Secondly, different distributions will typically result in different sets of win-
ners and losers, and if the economy as a whole grows due to the use of the 
potential Pareto-improvement rule, there will be more places where one can 
win. The average agent is an obvious winner, but even poor people can be 
expected to be able to improve their situation.  
 
Thirdly, if actual compensations should be provided in detail from every 
winner to every loser, this would result in huge transaction costs. In most 
cases they do not know each other, and typically it is not even obvious who 
is affected, neither ex ante nor ex post, due to unclear lines of causality, un-
certainty about the baseline case, etc. A vast bureaucracy would be needed in 
order to record not only each and every single cost and benefit separately but 
also exactly where, when, and on whom they fall, and to guarantee that the 
transfers were actually carried out.  
 
These are all quite reasonable arguments under certain circumstances. Their 
validity depends, first of all, on the actual presence of welfare regulations 
that deals with serious distributive consequences otherwise (Campen 1986, 
40). This is not always the case, of course. So, even though, theoretically, 
everybody may have a better chance of improving his or her situation when 
the economy is thriving, it is still necessary to give decision-makers a clear 
picture of where the costs and benefits are landing. Moreover, cost benefit 
analysis cannot abolish the rights of citizens, including private property 
rights, and compensation claims are often unavoidable.  
 
In cross-national settings, where no regular compensatory mechanisms are 
operational, the use of the potential Pareto-improvement criterion becomes 
even more controversial. If all impacts of a certain project are placed in poor 
countries, where costs – including “statistical lives” – are cheap, while all 
benefits are moved to members of rich countries, this may be an improve-
ment when measured in economic terms, but would appear offending in 
most people’s opinion. 
 
Even when no-one’s legal rights are threatened by a project or policy, it is 
still important to identify winners and losers. If, for instance, disproportion-
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ately high costs of a project or policy are borne by a limited group of people, 
maybe even some of the worst off people in society, this would in itself be a 
good reason for changing or rejecting the project or policy. This is also re-
flected in the economic assessment guidelines of the U.S. OMB and EPA 
(U.S. OMB, 16; U.S. EPA, Chp. 9) as well as in the U.K. Treasury Green 
Book, although none of these recommend a specific methodology. Both sets 
of guidelines are open for the possibility that various groups or sub-
populations are weighted differently in impact assessment analyses, on the 
basis of separate equity assessments. Local costs and benefits, or costs and 
benefits falling on particularly disadvantaged people, for example, may thus 
be given more weight in the account. The identification and definition of 
relevant sub-groups is not an easy job, though, as can be seen, for instance, 
in the attempt to set up a framework in the U.S. EPA Guidelines. 
 
It does not always make a case better, if real (instead of potential) Pareto-
improvement is used as criterion. Sometimes this may actually worsen 
things. The reason is that questions of equity typically are ignored in cost-
benefit analysis. For instance, in some assessments of what would count as 
reasonable policy reactions to the increasing greenhouse effect it is assumed 
that status quo and ‘normal’ economic development function as baseline for 
negotiations. In this case any cut in the use of fossil fuels in order to slow 
climate change would hurt countries like Saudi Arabia, USA, Russia or Chi-
na with large deposits of oil, gas, or coal. According to the actual Pareto-
improvement scheme these countries should be compensated for their losses 
– as is often the case when agreements are international (Azar 2000). Who 
should compensate them, then? The winners, of course. Who are they? 
Those countries, or individuals, who benefit from the abatement, i.e., the 
poorest people who do not have enough economic and technological means 
to avoid the negative impacts of an increasing greenhouse effect.  
 
Another distributive problem related to cost-benefit analysis is that willing-
ness to pay is depending on ability to pay. Wealthy people’s wishes count 
more than poor people’s wishes. The standard justification is, firstly, that 
this just reflects the situation on the market, which cost-benefit analysis is 
supposed to imitate. If this is not equitable, it has to be dealt with otherwise. 
Secondly, in many cases the sheer number of people influencing the market 
situation tends to diminish the influence of particular groups (Marshall 
1920/1946, 19). 
 
Still, it is necessary to assess whether this argument is applicable in each 
particular case. This leaves us once again with two ways to deal with the 
problem in relation to cost-benefit analysis. Either one can argue that cost-
benefit analysis should not pay much attention to this problem, but stick to 
its standard methodology and leave it to the decision-makers to take care of 
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the problem otherwise, or one can insist that this concern should be reflected 
explicitly in the analysis, for instance, by valuing the poor individual’s extra 
dollar higher than the rich individual’s. 
 
Distributions across generations 
 
There are several issues where the gainers and the losers, the tortfeasors and 
the negatively affected parties, are situated in different generations. The 
increasing greenhouse effect is the most obvious example, but there are 
many others: irreversible losses of biodiversity, radioactive waste from nu-
clear plants, losses of non-renewable resources like fossil fuels, ground wa-
ter pollution, etc. 
 
It is worth noticing that when we are talking about equitable distribution 
across generations it no longer makes sense to use the homo economicus 
construct exclusively as starting point. If everybody acted as egocentric bus-
ybodies only looking for mutual advantage contracts, future generations 
would be the first to loose (Barry 1989, 189ff). They will never be able to do 
anything for us, nor will they ever be able to harm us in any serious way. It 
has been argued, though, that the relation between generations can be con-
ceived of as a contract involving three currently living and equally selfish 
generations (Gauthier 1986), and that the different generational interests 
would balance each other in a way similar to the equilibrium of opposing 
interests on the market. However, if everybody really were as selfish as it is 
assumed in economic calculations, it would be quite obvious to drop all ob-
ligations to future people a number of generations away. In this case it would 
be easy to ignore problems that could be kept away for a certain amount of 
time.  
 
According to Layard & Glaister this is actually the position of most econo-
mists, who are only willing to judge projects in terms of present welfare 
effects. Layard and Glaister themselves support the opposite view that cost-
benefit analysis “aims to throw light on what is right,” and, accordingly, 
cannot find any excuse for ignoring future generations (Layard & Glaister 
1996, 33). A parallel distinction can also be found in the chapter on inter-
temporal equity and discounting in the IPCC Working Group III report from 
1996 (Arrow et.al. 1996): the so-called “descriptive” approach begins with 
evidence from actual decisions, whatever ethical positions these may happen 
to express, whereas the so-called “prescriptive” approach begins with ethical 
considerations. This way of constructing the difference is somewhat confus-
ing, however, because the so-called descriptive approach actually does take a 
specific ethical stance. It is simply using the potential Pareto-improvement 
criterion in a cross-generational context, despite the obvious lack of direct 
compensatory mechanisms. In general, the supporters of this approach are 
Arler  ·  635 
 
assuming that a continuous economic growth will be in the interest of future 
generations as well. 
 
All differences apart, all parties do agree that future costs and benefits 
should not count as much as current ones. Future net benefits should be dis-
counted in order to find the net present value. Estimated future costs and 
benefits are accordingly decreased in current calculations by a discount fac-
tor 1/(1+r)t where r is the discount rate and t is a time index.  
 
Several reasons have been put forward in defence of this claim. Firstly, it is 
argued that somehow we have to reduce the influence of future consequenc-
es on current decisions. Otherwise, the sheer weight of costs and benefits of 
an infinite or at least extremely vast number of future people may happen to 
be so colossal that impacts on present generations would count next to noth-
ing, and the required savings rate would become “absurdly high” (Arrow 
1999). By discounting future impacts, current people’s interests become 
more visible in the calculation. Discounting all kinds of future consequences 
without differentiation is a way too high prize to pay on this account, how-
ever. This argument is obviously based on some equity consideration which 
is foreign to the basic utilitarian assumption of cost-benefit analysis that 
maximisation of utility is the basic goal, no matter how costs and benefits 
are distributed. A hard-core utilitarian would have to say: yes, present gener-
ations will suffer from the burden – so what? 
 
But even if equity considerations are included, giving due respect to all gen-
erations, social discounting may not be the right answer to the problems of 
the current generation. One of the basic points in “doing the right thing” in 
relation to cross-generational issues is to preserve the spectrum of attractive 
opportunities in order to keep up the possibility of welfare (or a good life) 
for time to come. This point is totally blurred if all future consequences – 
including, for instance, losses of future lives – are discounted by the same 
factor. 
 
Secondly, it is assumed that people in general prefer to have current needs 
and wants satisfied rather than those they may have in the future. People are 
believed to be so impatient that they are not willing to save as much for the 
future as a cool calculation would advise them to do. This is usually referred 
to as the pure time preference argument, and is often transferred from the 
individual level to society at large. For example, the U.K. Treasury refers to 
it in the following naïve way: “Society as a whole (sic!) prefers to receive 
goods and services sooner than later, and to defer costs to future genera-
tions” (U.K. Treasury 2000, 26). This statement is justified by reference to 
people’s present market behaviour. It appears almost democratic, then, to 
take account of these preferences. The truth is that it is not democratic at all. 
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Firstly, consumers’ selfish behaviour should not be confused with that of 
responsible citizens. Secondly, the opinion of future people (or their current 
advocates) on the issue are not included even though they are obviously part 
of the same “society as a whole.” 
 
The pure time preference argument is not convincing even for individuals. 
Of course there are individuals with a short planning horizon, or people who 
believe that their self at time t0 is so different from the future self at time t1, 
that this is actually a different person, whom the self at t0 only feels partly 
responsible for. But from a societal point of view, why should the person’s 
needs (or preferences) at t1 be less important than the person’s needs at t0? 
The argument loses all credibility in the case of cross-generational distribu-
tion, where costs and benefits fall on different sets of people, who are all part 
of the same “society as a whole” although with different locations on a time 
line.  
 
Thirdly, technological improvement and economic growth in society is like-
ly to make people richer in the future, at least in the near future, and at least 
in terms of consumer goods. If future people are expected to be richer than 
we are, it may not seem equitable that we should use large sums to improve 
their welfare further, for instance, by avoiding unfortunate environmental 
impacts. Moreover, if we could invest our money in projects that are more 
profitable, this may be to the advantage of future people, too. Consequently, 
there should be some proportion in current people’s effort; future people’s 
costs should be seen in relation to their presumably higher income, which 
may be assumed also to result in a lower marginal utility of each extra gain 
(unless it is believed that future people are more difficult to satisfy due to 
more expensive tastes which current people ought to support). Future costs 
and benefits should be discounted, accordingly, at the expected rate of eco-
nomic growth or growth of consumption (g) multiplied by the presumed 
elasticity of marginal utility (θ). 
 
This argument, again, is an argument from equity. It is also an argument, 
however, which is based on assumptions that may happen to be quite precar-
ious. Whereas it is true that the general trend for several hundred years has 
been one of economic growth, it is no longer quite as obvious that this trend 
will continue to be dominant hundreds of years from now. After all, several 
of the key resources in the current period of exceptional economic growth 
have become more difficult to extract; fossil fuels being the primary case. 
Although science and technology can be expected to continue to improve, 
and thus to be finding new means and paths, the sheer size of an economy 
several times bigger than the current one makes the whole scenario rather 
incalculable – with an interest rate of 6 percent (quite common in cost-
benefit calculations) we are talking about an economy some 18 times bigger 
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then the current one within half a century. Not even a radical decoupling of 
economic and material growth would seem to suffice. Moreover, even 
though future people may happen to be wealthier in terms of consumer 
goods they may also be poorer in terms on non-monetised goods. The argu-
ment thus assumes that each and every good can be substituted for. Finally, 
if the expectation that future people will be richer is used as an argument for 
discounting, consistency would obviously demand that richer people in gen-
eral should count less in cost-benefit analysis. Otherwise, two separate issues 
– the issue of obligations to future generation and the issue of distributive 
inequality – are all too easily getting mixed up in an improper way. 
 
Fourthly, it can be argued that current people care less and less about future 
people the further away these people live, because we know less and less 
about who they are and what they cherish. In the long run, our effort to im-
prove the conditions of future people may not hit the target at all, because 
they may not share our values or preferences. The effort should therefore not 
have the same priority as efforts to help current people who can be asked 
about their needs and wants. People in the far future can be compared to 
people on the other side of the globe or to current people with a way of life 
very different from our own. There seems to be an empathetic distance. Dis-
counting their costs and benefits could be seen as a reflection of our lack of 
interest due to the plausible diminishing compatibility of our and their cul-
tural values. 
 
This argument may seem to be strengented by the fact that, in certain cases, 
a large part of the beneficiaries will be descendants of current people of the 
third world. There will be relatively more people in these countries in the 
future, and these people will be more vulnerable to climate change than fu-
ture rich people in the industrialized countries. Policies of greenhouse gas 
mitigation, in particular, may thus be likened to foreign aid programs (Schel-
ling 1999). If we do not give much support to poor people in other countries 
today, why should we support their probably somewhat richer descendants 
more thoroughly? If we actually want to make sacrifices in order to give 
more help to the poor people of the world, why not invest in immediate im-
provement instead? If this leads to economic development today, future peo-
ple in these parts of the world would also be less vulnerable to climate 
change.  
 
At least two arguments can be put forward against this kind of reasoning. 
The analogy between future people and current people with a different cul-
ture is misleading at one point: we are not directly responsible for the fate of 
current people in other parts of the world, whereas we do hold the destiny of 
future people in our hand. Responsibility matters. Moreover, we do have the 
possibility of influencing future culture to a larger degree than current cul-
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ture in foreign countries. They may not be as foreign to us as the argument 
assumes, but should rather be seen as descendants of a common culture of 
argument. It should be noticed, also, that this line of argument is more suita-
ble for communitarians (de-Shalit 1995) than for economists working in the 
neoclassical tradition, trying to reduce common values to private prefer-
ences. For them emphatic distance cannot be an issue, and, consequently, no 
serious reason for discounting future costs and benefits. 
 
A fifth reason given for discounting is that future costs and benefits are more 
uncertain. Unforeseeable events like war, natural disasters, etc. may happen 
to change the whole scheme. Likewise, if we do a lot for the far future, we 
cannot be sure that the generations in between will not do what mainstream 
economists expect them to do: look at their own advantage and let go of the 
generations further down the road. The further away in time we look the 
more probable it is that something will be happening in the meantime. Dis-
counting may appear to be a solution to this problem, because it reflects the 
diminishing ability to foresee the situation of future people. A problem with 
this solution is that it confuses two separate issues: the risk of future benefits 
and the length of time until they materialize (U.S. EPA 2000, 37; Møller 
2003). Not all current investments are equally risky, so this can hardly be the 
basis for the use of a general discount rate, which works from day one.  
 
Short-term discounting cannot be equalized with long-term discounting. In 
the second case the use of even a modest discount rate will erase remote 
impacts from current accounts. For this reason several authors have suggest-
ed lowering the discount rate over the years until it is close to zero in the 
distant future (cf. several contributions in Portney & Weyant 1999; U.K. 
Treasury 2000). One problem with this approach is that it easily leads to the 
so-called time inconsistency problem: the discount rate would have to be 
changed every time a new planning process begins, and the rate in a new 
plan would necessarily contradict those in older plans. This does not appear 
to be too much of a problem, though. A more radical solutions would be to 
drop some of the basic assumptions in cost-benefit analysis altogether in 
relation to decision making in cases like the increasing greenhouse effect, 
where the most serious impacts can be expected to lie in the far future, and 
concentrate on the basic questions of equity instead (Lind & Schuler 1998).  
 
The question of discounting is handled very unevenly by different institu-
tions and analysts. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget recommends 
a discount rate of 7 percent (U.S. OMB 1992 and 1996), but in the latest 
draft of new guidelines they recommend to use a 3 percent rate as well 
(OMB 2003). The U.S. EPA recommends a general 2-3 percent rate for in-
tra-generational discounting (equal to the historical records of the consump-
tion rate of interest). It is also recommended that a 7 percent rate is used in 
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sensitivity tests, together with a “no discounting scenario” (without value 
summation) in relation to inter-generational issues like the increasing green-
house effect (U.S. EPA 2000, 48 and 52). The British Green Book recom-
mends a short-term (<30 years) discount rate of 3.5 percent, calculated on 
the basis of a) pure rate of consumption together with catastrophe risk: 1.5 
percent, plus b) the annual growth in per capita consumption: 2 percent; in 
relation to long-term effects it is recommended to use a declining discount 
rate (U.K. Treasury 2000, 97ff). All of this is significantly lower than rec-
ommendations from previous Treasury guidelines. The ExternE-project rec-
ommends a 3 percent discount rate (using 0 and 10 percent rates in sensitivi-
ty tests), but uses other rates in certain situations (European Commission 
1999, 64f). The Danish Ministry of Finance recommends a general discount 
rate of 6 percent (Finansministeriet 1999, Appendix C), based on estimates 
of the opportunity costs of capital, i.e., the missed potential returns from 
present alternative (private) investments. Reports from the Danish Ministry 
of the Environment, on the other hand, recommend a discount rate of 3 and 2 
percent respectively, but it is also recommended that projects should yield an 
effective dividend of at least 5 percent (Møller et.al. 2000, Møller 2003). 
 
The next question to turn up is this: should all costs and benefits be dis-
counted at the same rate, or should some costs or benefits be treated sepa-
rately? If future people are actually going to be as rich as it is assumed by 
analysts, who prefer a high discount rate, this will undoubtedly influence the 
combination of preferred goods. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, 
that people living a couple of hundred years from now are going to be ten (or 
more) times richer than current people (in industrialised countries), as the 
use of even a fairly low rate of interest would imply. In this case it seems 
quite absurd to think that they are simply going to want ten times as many 
cars, washing machines, and egg boilers as today. Even if we assume that 
ordinary resource shortages are not going to prevent them from having these 
items (and this may happen to be a shaky assumption), is seems quite obvi-
ous that the preferred combination of desired goods will change.  
 
For instance, it seems likely that areas with a modest human impact and high 
biological diversity will be scarce in the future and therefore also economi-
cally valuable. This is a pattern already observed to some extent in current 
industrialised countries. Should this not be reflected in cost-benefit analysis, 
for example, by excluding these kinds of goods from discounting? The U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget recommends that these two issues are 
dealt with separately (U.S. OMB 1996, 12), whereas others recommend that 
scarce environmental goods are exempted from discounting (U.K. Treasury 
2000, 25) – or even discounted at a negative rate. 
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Another issue which could be dealt with separately is potential losses of 
human lives. If we assume that these losses are monetised as “statistical 
lives,” and that a discount rate of, say, 5 percent is used, one life lost today 
would count more than 100 lives lost a century from now. Methodology 
apart, it is not obvious at all what could make this right. Similarly, a foresee-
able catastrophic event in the far future cannot be treated on a par with some 
minor welfare changes over a long period. 
 
The choice of discount rate has significant impact on the assessment of long-
terms projects and policies. There is not one single rate which can be rec-
ommended without further qualification. In relation to intergenerational is-
sues the choice is basically a matter of equity. When a high rate is chosen 
this is usually done on the basis of very optimistic assumptions about con-
tinuous economic growth and unlimited substitutability of resources – often 
combined with a lack of interest in the destiny of future people (disguised as 
a high “societal pure time preference”). On the other hand, the choice of a 
low rate (in general or in relation to specific goods) signals less optimism, 
more concern for futurity and/or for preservation of critical and unique re-
sources. The use of several different rates (at least in sensitivity tests) desig-
nates that this is not a question which is appropriate for economists to deal 
with on their own. 
 
 
The use of cost-benefit analysis 
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is grounded methodologically in the private society 
conception, which sees society as a mutually beneficial aggregation of pri-
vate consumers who all try to maximize the satisfaction of their own prefer-
ences, whatever these may happen to be (Rawls 1973). The market is the 
basic model for social relations, and interventions in the market are not con-
sidered appropriate, unless some kind of failure appears, which cannot be 
dealt with otherwise. Even in these cases the market should be imitated as 
far as possible.  
 
However, society is something else, too. It is just as much a union of unions 
(families, associations, communities, nations, etc.) working together in a 
common effort to further the good life, the identification and refinement of 
which is one of society’s main tasks. Commitment, equity, and quality are 
key concepts here. Seen from this angle the market is only one out of a num-
ber of types of social organisations, each of which is appropriate for a specif-
ic set of purposes. Like any other kind of social organisation, it is in need of 
a permanent evaluation and justification. It has its strengths, but also a series 
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of weaknesses, wherefore it should be kept within proper confines. Wherev-
er it can be shown to further the good life it should be applauded; wherever 
not it should be limited in a reasonable way.  
 
In the first conception, the private consumers (or should we rather say: their 
self-regarding preferences) are always considered sovereign – even in cases 
that cannot be dealt with properly by the market. Where markets fail, cost-
benefit analysis moves in and estimates what would happen if, contrafactual-
ly, the market mechanisms were capable of doing their normal job. In the 
second conception, the primary agents in social affairs are the citizens, who 
are expected to take the viewpoint of society at large throughout their delib-
erations. According to this second conception one of the citizens’ most im-
portant regular tasks is, in general as well as in each particular case, to iden-
tify the borders between what must be considered private and social affairs, 
respectively.  
 
Some cost-benefit analysts tend to believe that the private society conception 
is an altogether adequate image. Most analysts do seem to be aware of sev-
eral of its shortcomings, however, but consider it to be a reasonable proxy, 
which can be used methodologically to enlighten and improve citizens’ and 
decision makers’ treatment of complex issues. They recognize the need to 
take into consideration other concerns, which cost-benefit analysis is not 
suited to deal with, but insist that many issues can be treated much more 
systematically by means of economic analysis.  
 
Even in cases where impacts are difficult to monetise, cost-benefit analysis 
can deliver a framework, which makes it possible to deal with these issues in 
a systematic way. The U.S. EPA, for instance, argues in the following way: 
“Benefit-cost analysis is not a precise tool that yields firm numerical results, 
rather, it is a general framework for more carefully accounting for the po-
tential and varied effects of government programs. Some of these effects can 
be quantified, whereas others can only be assessed qualitatively. Some may 
be relatively certain, whereas others may be quite speculative” (U.S. EPA 
2000, 33). Despite all its weaknesses, the analysis does contribute to the 
decision making process by way of its methodological grip on most signifi-
cant components of an issues. 
 
On the other hand, critics do have a number of serious objections against the 
growing use of cost-benefit analysis in decision making, several of which 
have already been mentioned.  
 
- A basic problem is the confusion of consumers and citizens. Social affairs 
are treated as private affairs. Political decisions are treated as if they were 
market decisions.  
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- Due to factors like lack of information, fallacies and misconceptions, self 
deception, lack of clarity about goals and measures, individual preferen-
ces are seldom clear, continuous, or well-founded. Yet they are regarded 
as the sole basis for cost-benefit evaluations.  
- On the market decisions are taken individually in a series, not collecti-
vely in a group (to use Sartre’s expressions). This often leads to problems 
of sub-optimality, as is well-known from examples like the prisoners’ di-
lemma. Yet it is assumed in cost-benefit analysis that common decisions 
should be aggregations of individual decisions.  
- Non-marketed goods are monetised, even though several of these goods 
are kept away from the market deliberately, as is the case with human li-
ves and unique resources.  
- Equity issues are to a large extent ignored in cost-benefit analysis. This is 
the case with the baseline scenario as well as with the distribution of im-
pacts. The institutional setup, which determines how the market works, is 
beyond critique. Wealthy persons’ wants count more in cost-benefit ana-
lysis than those of poor people. 
- Cost-benefit analysis is unreliable in long-term predictions due to the 
changes in valuation occurring along with the alteration of the situations 
in which the valuations occur. 
- All too often basic assumptions are hidden in a methodological 
framework, which is not easily seen through, if one is not familiar with 
economic analysis.  
- The scientific and quantitative presentation is seductive and deceptive, 
because it signals a higher degree of certainty than cost-benefit analysis 
can actually achieve.   
 
As we have seen above, some of these problems can be reduced in various 
ways. Assumptions can be stated more explicitly. More emphasis can be put 
on sensitivity tests. Uncertainties can be underlined. Qualitative components 
can be integrated in the analysis. Problems of equity can be given a more 
prominent position. Yet some of the basic problems cannot be dealt with this 
way.  
 
Many economists argue that it is inappropriate to criticise the use of cost-
benefit analysis by comparing it with an idealised democracy, where every-
body’s voice is heard equally, everybody yields to the best argument, etc. 
(cf., for instance, Boardman et.al. 1996, 46; Turner 1979). Firstly, they point 
out, this is not how actual governmental processes works. The powerful in-
terest groups are the ones who are listened to. Power all too often overrules 
arguments. Cost-benefit analysis reveals the interests of less powerful groups 
and includes them in decision making procedures. 
Arler  ·  643 
 
Secondly, even though each individual’s preferences are seldom clear, con-
sistent, and well-founded, the large number of people’s preferences included 
in the analysis tends to make up for this. What cost-benefit analysis can do is 
to give important hints to decision makers about proportions and priorities. If 
conclusions are fairly clear, even after a sensitivity test has been made, this 
is in most cases a very good indication that the case in well-founded. 
 
Thirdly, even though monetisation of externalities is shaky business, it is 
important to include these estimates, because otherwise environmental bene-
fits are easily forgotten. Without economic values on non-marketed goods, 
only the (often: high) costs of preserving goods like nature sites or reducing 
health risks are left out in the quantitative part of the account. And accounts 
in monetary quantities often appear more convincing to policy makers than 
qualitative descriptions of phenomena, the importance and proportion of 
which can be difficult to estimate. 
 
Finally, cost-benefit analysis has much less influence on decision making 
than the critics assume. It is difficult to identify just one decision made sole-
ly on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis should be con-
sidered as one among several tools, which decision makers can use. Other 
concerns may overrule the results of cost-benefit analysis, or other tools may 
be more adequate in certain situations.  
 
Methodology cannot replace ethical judgement. In the end ethical and politi-
cal decisions have to be made on the basis on many at least partly incom-
mensurable factors. Cost-benefit analysis can often improve decision making 
due to its systematic treatment of the issue at hand. This is particularly true 
in relatively limited cases, which mainly include goods that are traded on 
markets. One needs to be very careful about its use, however, and even more 
so in more comprehensive cases, which involve several non-marketed costs 
and benefits, or where long time impacts play an important role. Cost-benefit 
analysis can be very seductive, indeed, and one of the main virtues, a deci-
sion maker needs to have, is to be resistant to its magic in order to handle it 
with an appropriate amount of care and caution. 
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